Principal–Agent Problems In PMC Use

In a second line of research, I look at private military companies through the lens of principal–agent theory. Here, I treat states as principals who contract PMCs as agents to perform highly sensitive tasks in complex Middle Eastern war zones. My focus is on the tensions, misunderstandings and outright failures that emerge in this relationship: moral hazard, agency drift and the difficulties of monitoring armed contractors who operate far from home and often in legal gray areas.

I compare different cases to see how contract design, oversight mechanisms and regulatory environments influence PMC behaviour on the ground. This allows me to explain why some delegations of force “work” as intended, while others lead to excessive violence, scandal or political backlash. For me, this project is a way to connect the big question of why strong states use PMCs alongside their armies with the micro-level mechanisms of control and loss of control, giving my dissertation a more rigorous analytical backbone.